Policies

Defence

GLOBAL THREATS ARE CHANGING, AND SO MUST AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE STRATEGY

  • End the nuclear subs deal
  • Reassessing defence ties with the US
  • Deterrence and why we need it
  • Cheaper, expendable high-volume weapons systems with greater stand-off deterrence
  • Paid combat training for willing volunteers
  • Seeking an equivalent “Article 5” from key allies

Policy Summary

Donald Trump’s return to the White House has destabilised long-standing global security alliances. Allies such as those in NATO—and countries like Australia—now face deep uncertainty about America’s reliability. Trump’s erratic behaviour, admiration for authoritarian leaders, and transactional approach to diplomacy make Australia’s dependence on the U.S. as its primary security partner increasingly risky. This includes the controversial AUKUS nuclear submarine deal, which ties Australia to the U.S. and U.K. for submarines expected sometime in the middle to late 2030s at a cost of $5 billion each.

The Good Party has been critical of the deal from the start, not just due to cost and timing, but also over the unresolved issue of nuclear waste and Australia’s lack of sovereign control. In reality and critically, the subs would serve American foreign policy interests, not necessarily Australia’s. Even if there were no other issues, that alone has to be a deal breaker.

The current state of democracy in the US is also a fundamental issue here: if its political system can produce a leader like Trump, it could produce worse. The Good Party argues this uncertainty makes AUKUS untenable and, if given the opportunity, we would abandon the deal. That raises the next question: what should Australia do instead?

And in more detail...

The arrival of Donald Trump in the White House for a second term has thrown the normally stable system of global security alliances into disarray. That’s because the long-term friends of the United States are no longer sure of Trump’s commitment to that friendship if, for example, Russia decides to attack a NATO-aligned country. At worst, perhaps Trump isn’t a friend at all. At best, there’s an unacceptable degree of uncertainty about what he is.

This uncertainty is as much a problem for Australia as it is for Western Europe because, for more than 70 years now, we’ve also relied on America as our main security partner. Given Trump’s erratic nature and his apparent preference for dictators, that reliance is called into question. And then there are those American five nuclear submarines we’ve committed to and started paying for under the AUKUS agreement (which includes the United Kingdom).

The Good Party has never been a fan of these subs. There’s the cost of them ($5 billion each), the timing (coming sometime in 2030), and the issue of nuclear waste disposal. The US Congress could consider that shipyards aren’t delivering the mandated 2 Virginia-class submarines to the US Navy and put an end to our earmarked boats at the stroke of a pen. There’s also the reality that our nuclear subs, if they were to arrive, would be considered by the Americans as instruments of their foreign policy. They won’t be ours to command as we see fit. While that’s unacceptable at the best of times, now consider the Trump factor. While he’ll be long gone, he has sent the US down an uncertain path politically. And if the American political system can give the world someone like Trump, it could conceivably deliver far worse. The uncertainty compounds.

For these reasons, the Good Party would scuttle the AUKUS submarine deal if given the chance. That begs the question — what would be the replacement strategy? First, let’s take a look at why we might need submarines at all.

The Good Party would scuttle the AUKUS submarine deal if given the chance

China, the Panda in the room

For many years, the relationship between Australia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been based on mutual respect and shared interests. With our vast resources, especially iron ore, our nation has benefited financially from China’s rise. And within Australia, we also have a large and energetic Chinese diaspora that contributes to our society's economic and cultural vibrancy.

On the other side of the ledger, the Communist Party of China has lately exhibited an aggressive posture toward its immediate neighbours and the region.

In addition, for more than a decade now, and despite any threat or provocation, the PRC has been investing heavily in its armed forces as well as building numerous military bases on reclaimed islands in the South China Sea. The question must be asked of the Communist Party’s leadership — what’s the agenda?

The Communist Party of China has lately exhibited an increasingly bellicose and aggressive attitude toward its immediate neighbours and the region.

The world is becoming increasingly dangerous

With Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, "Pax Americana," that long period of peace underwritten by American hegemony, has looked shaky. And with the PRC’s bellicose behaviour, what does that mean to us in Australia?

Easy pickings...?

Australia is in the middle of nowhere, roughly in the neighbourhood of Asia, but way down the bottom, at the end of the line. This geography suited us once. It put us beyond the reach of potential adversaries. And, because of the remote location, we held no practical strategic importance. But times and technology have repositioned us. Now, it’s our very isolation that potentially makes us easy pickings for a world power. On paper, what a ripe and juicy plum Australia would be for China should it decide that more land is needed to settle its masses, along with food and raw materials to sustain them.

Are there signs that this intent is anything other than hypothetical? There are two. Firstly, back in WWII, the Imperial Forces of Japan neatly cut Australia off from the world by taking the Solomon Islands, allowing the emperor’s forces to sit astride our sea and air routes with America. The PRC has recently achieved the same thing as Japan’s Imperial forces back in '42 simply by signing a bilateral security cooperation agreement with the Solomon Islands. China could now, if it chooses to in the future, cut us off from our current principal ally, the United States, with not a shot fired.

On paper, what a ripe and juicy plum Australia would be for China should it decide that it required land for its unsettled populations, food for its millions, and raw materials for its hungry economy

This development is a problem for Australia, and its seriousness can’t be overstated. The wording of the agreement allows the PRC, under conditions that it could engineer, to station a considerable military force right on our doorstep and cut off the sea route to the United States.

And there's the other critical sea route to and from Australia through the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. But with the PRC garrisoning those reclaimed islands and Beijing eyeing Taiwan covetously, Australia could effectively be cut off from the rest of the world with a simple naval blockade.

The deterrence puzzle

While it's often said that the best defence is a good offence, in fact, the best defence is a good offence never used. In other words, the best defence is deterrence, enough to ensure a shot is never fired.

Deterrence is defined as “convincing the enemy's decision-makers that the price they’ll have to pay to achieve their strategic goals will be too costly for the perceived benefit.”

So, what's Australia's deterrent? Given that China, for example, can call on military assets with numbers roughly forty times larger than ours, it can be fairly said that we don’t have one.

What about alliances

Australia is effectively on its own should an adversary launch an invasion. Our traditional and longest-standing defence alliance has been the ANZUS treaty, an agreement between us and New Zealand and, separately, between the United States and us, signed off in 1951. But the treaty merely recognises that an attack on one of us threatens the others and that we “should” all join to meet that common threat. Hardly a guarantee of support. Especially when there’s a purely transactional government like the one currently occupying the White House that’s dismissive of alliances and friendships. Can we reliably expect that it would stare down aggression from a peer nation state on our behalf if assistance carried with it the threat of a nuclear war?

Then there’s AUKUS, our trilateral security pact with the UK and the US. As discussed, it has problems.

Another security agreement is the “QUAD,” a four-way "strategic security dialogue" between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, an acknowledged response to China's growing global economic and strategic power, specifically in the Asia-Pacific region. It’s not, though, a treaty that comes with a military response if help is required.

Finally, there's the "Five Eyes" (FVEY) security arrangement between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the United States. This is an intelligence-sharing alliance.  If a superpower like China does come for us, at least we'll get fair warning.

Several other security arrangements exist between Australia and countries such as Indonesia and Japan, but none carry ironclad security guarantees.

Put all these treaties and agreements in a Venn diagram, and the United States is in the sweet spot. However, with the US in the thrall of MAGA and its “America First” ideology, there’s real doubt that it would answer the call if a war came to our shores.

The "Echidna Strategy" — a layered defence

Today, Australia is more vulnerable to attack than at any other time in its history. Unfortunately, successive governments over the past 20 years have proven incapable of reading the geopolitical tea leaves. The Australian Defence Force (ADF), comprising the Australian Army, the Royal Australian Navy, and the Royal Australian Air Force, has been structured as an augmentation force. It is not a stand-alone deterrent. It’s organised and equipped to assist, say, US Forces or to lend a hand enforcing a United Nations mandate. This has to change.

Australian defence analysts agree that we require a layered defence deterrent. Think of these layers as the quills of an echidna (or porcupine if you live elsewhere than Australia)

Australian defence analysts agree that we require a layered defence deterrent. Think of these layers as the quills of an echidna (or porcupine if you live elsewhere than Australia). The longest quill is our submarine fleet, able to engage unfriendly forces at a great distance from Australian waters. Even assuming the nine US-made nuclear-powered attack boats currently being reviewed by Australia's defence establishment arrive in time to be useful, if we’re up against the People’s Liberation Army Navy, it currently fields 74 submarines with more on the way—hardly a balanced contest.

Echidna

The next longest quill capable of engaging targets in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific is the Royal Australian Navy's surface vessels, destroyers and frigates, armed with anti-ship missiles. Australia currently has eleven of these ships in total. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has 32 destroyers on active duty. Plus cruisers, frigates, two aircraft carriers (with a third recently launched but not yet operational) and a substantial resupply fleet.

If the PRC's war machine, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), arrived just over the horizon, the RAAF's 72 F-35 Lightning II stealth fighters would join the fight, going up against potentially more than 1000 of the fighters China currently has on active duty.

Then, should the PLA, the world's largest professional army, decide to land its forces on our soil, it currently has over 2,000,000 men-at-arms with a further 500,000 reserves that it can call on. The Australian Army, highly regarded though it is, totals around 60,000 active-duty personnel, including reservists.

Of course, there would be monumental logistics issues for China to pull off an invasion of this scale, but would the PRC have to marshal all its forces to ensure victory over us? All it needs to do is target a few key assets for demonstration purposes in Sydney and Melbourne with missiles, neutralise a few bases, and put boots on the ground to capture Parliament House in Canberra. Or it could simply blockade us — essentially starve us into submission. With those supply routes covered in the northeast and northwest, and Australia would be toast.

So, how can we turn that around?

The Echidna could use some extra quills

Australia needs to augment its deterrence posture, and it needs to get on with it. Instead of the American nuclear-powered submarines, there are quieter, stealthier diesel-electric boats available from Germany, Sweden and Japan. They take between 4 and 7 years to build. Meanwhile, as a stand-in, we need proven high-technology assets that can be bought now, "off the shelf."

The Albanese government recognises the need for this and recently announced the purchase of the Norwegian Naval Strike Missile (NSM), an anti-ship missile with a range of 250 kilometres that can be fired from several platforms, including ships and aircraft.

Twenty US-made High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), the very mobile launch rocket platform that has proved so effective in the defence of Ukraine's sovereignty, have also been purchased along with Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles (with a 300km range) to arm them.

HIMARS and the NSM are worthwhile and timely assets that will provide our defence force with some much-needed offensive capability. The original Good Party defence paper published on this website proposed that Australia should tap the AUKUS relationship and have additional missiles launched by HIMARS manufactured here under license. We’re pleased to see that the proposal has recently been adopted. Maximising self-reliance in the production of defence assets should be a central goal of Australia's national security strategy. (See our policy on the Economy)

Smart sea mines utilising AI capable of distinguishing friendlies from enemies are also in the shopping trolley, making any unwanted approach to our shores treacherous.

Australia's defence industries already have considerable experience designing and building semi-autonomous Collaborative Combat Vehicles (armed drones) such as the highly praised Loyal Wingman (aka the "Ghost Bat"). These need to go into production in useful numbers as soon as possible to augment our F-35s.

Given the long lead time before new submarines of any configuration join the RAN, Australia should consider a stopgap deterrent—one of those longer quills—and investigate the purchase of the new, reportedly undetectable American B-21 Raider stealth bombers. Several squadrons of these would provide an "invisible" and potentially formidable delivery platform for those anti-ship NSMs. We would then need sophisticated air defence missile batteries to defend the airfields they’d operate from. B-21 bombers will be in service with the USAF as early as 2026.

Last but by no means least, a formidable cyber-war capability is also now an absolute necessity.

But even assuming our Echidna bristles with quills, what if the unthinkable happens and our adversary observes that Australia is naked and vulnerable and commits to invasion once its forces penetrate our stand-off defences? What would we do? What could we do?

Providing paid combat training for willing volunteers

While arming Australia's population sounds like a terrible idea on the face of it, the Good Party believes the argument for having an effective “boots-on-the-ground” deterrent should be considered. A population trained to fight would be a far more effective deterrent than almost anything else.

The Good Party believes the argument for having an effective “boots-on-the-ground” deterrent shouldn't be ignored. A population trained to fight would be a far more effective deterrent than almost anything else

The world has learned much from Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Two lessons:

  1. Invasion is highly unlikely right up to the moment you're invaded
  2. It can take as little as three weeks to train accountants, librarians, and bus drivers to become acceptably competent in combat
Woman sniper

A similar model could serve Australia's needs. To be clear, we are not advocating for a return to conscription — mandatory military service. We are suggesting a three-week, non-compulsoryvoluntary paid course undertaken by, for example, tertiary students where the basics of fighting and surviving in a combat zone are taught.

Paid, live-fire combat and tactics courses would also be available to physically and mentally fit Australians up to the age of 65. These courses would be similar in nature to those currently schooling Ukrainian citizens.

Combat units within the Australian Reserves could provide the training.

Additional courses, such as the operation of anti-tank and anti-aircraft ordnance, would be offered to participants keen to take the training further. Some may choose to become trainers themselves or enlist in the Australian Army or Army Reserves.

First Nations Australians interested in spreading their bushcraft knowledge would be welcomed and employed throughout Australia.

Men and women of all ages might enjoy the experience and the camaraderie and would welcome learning these skills. And, since there are approximately 250,000 students finishing school each year, through a program like this, Australia could rapidly build a large reserve of combat-capable citizens. Then, say every three years, a paid two-week refresher course would keep their skills sharp.

Legislation would limit the deployment scope of this civilian deterrent force to Australian soil. It could not be dispatched to an overseas conflict.

The weapons and ammunition purchased for these volunteers would be securely cached in armouries dispersed among selected police, fire stations, SES depots, and military bases, monitored and maintained by professional armourers. This would prevent the guns from reaching our streets, avoiding America's Second Amendment disaster.

With a plan such as this, within five years, the ranks of our combat-trained volunteer defenders could swell to around 200,000[1]. That's a significant number. And the price tag? Less than $0.3 billion per year out of the current $45 billion annual defence budget, roughly equivalent to the cost of purchasing three-and-a-half additional F-35 fighter jets. However, the deterrence value of such a program would be out of all proportion to its modest price.

Is something like NATO in our region an option?

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation — NATO — assures its 32 member countries with a trigger called Article 5, which states that all will come to the aid of one in the event of an attack. Frankly, it's time Australia had an Article 5 it could call on with concrete consequences for any would-be aggressor.

Frankly, it's time Australia had an Article 5 it could call on with concrete consequences for any would-be aggressor

Perhaps it’s time for an Asia-Pacific-focused sister organisation to NATO. Call it PATO – the Pacific Area Treaty Organization. It’s worth noting that the US, the UK, and France have territorial interests in the Pacific due to their long history of engagement in the region.

Alternatively, the ANZUS treaty could be updated with an Article 5-like clause. At the very least, Australia needs to seek an ironclad guarantee from the US that we would be re-supplied in the event of an invasion. That would be a deterrent in itself.

A strong, free Australia is vital to the strategic security of the entire southern hemisphere. It also plays a critical role in global supply chains, providing meat, livestock, and grains, a wide range of ores and rare earth metals, and innovative science and technology. So, it’s in the world's interest for Australia to remain independent, stable, and free, and the Good Party will lobby hard for more and sharper echidna quills.

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